It never ceases to
amaze me that some folks, expert in one area, believe their expertise or excellence
automatically transfers to another area. I mean, they really believe it! Examples: physics → politics,
business → education, any domain → sports, chemistry → religion, and so on. We’ll call this the transference effect or the transference phenomenon.
[I'm not sure if this note is an admonition to others or a personal admission; let's make it both to be on the safe side.]
We restrict this note to arguments made outside one’s expertise, not within for which there are many more argument types. The expertise areas will be called domains. So, we are discussing the arguments made by a person, expert in one domain, toward conclusions made for another domain. For our purposes here we use the domains: Science, Education, Politics, Philosophy, Religion, Humanities, and Business. You may wish to add your own.
The types of assertions we discuss are direct assertions/propositions, not matters of rhetoric, linguistics, or misconceptions*. (Examples. Education should definitely follow a business model. If economists only knew some mathematics, we could finally understand the economy. Art is simple, if you understand perspective drawing.) This is usually done through an argument of some kind, purporting to be a proof. There are at least three kinds of argument, those based on faith/beliefs, those on emotion, and those on logic. The first two are not very convincing to anyone. If I argue to the businessman he/she should pursue a venture in Bolivia because I just feel its right, I may not make progress. If I argue a colleague the correctness of using prayer in the schools as a relaxation therapy on the basis of my personal faith, I may get nowhere. Emotional and belief based arguments are relatively weak and readily identified. The “proof” part of the argument dissolves.
Only the third has validity, therefore we’ll focus only on logical arguments (or proofs). Such arguments are the lingua franca of convincing discussion these days, and for such an argument to be convincing, it must proceed first from hypothesis, then premise to point, then point to point, …, and finally point to conclusion, all using standard logical methods such a deduction, contradiction, contrapositive, and the like. Using induction is tempting, but usually wrong in other than mathematical proofs - or as they say induction produces a weak proof. What we will see is that usually the logic is ok, but it is too often built upon weak and even incorrect premises.
In sum, inside the domain, we make arguments based on consensus axioms and established modes of reasoning appropriate for the considered domain. Within domains, there are standard and well established acceptance and rejection criteria. For math, the standard theorem and proof are used to make an argument. This causes some applied mathematicians difficulty and credibility problems as they often produce algorithms, models, and computer data in lieu of theorems. Physicists also use theorems, but with axioms that have their base in physics principles. Applied physicists, chemists, and many biologists use experimental methodologies, with their “finding” link with previous results. In education, the standard presentation of an argument is to (a) do a literature review, (b) state the research questions, (c) review the methodology of the intervention, (d) give results of the intervention, and (e) make conclusions. Each domain has its own accepted methods to argue.
Arguing outside the domain is another matter altogether. Normally, we try to use our same methodologies but in a different domain. The consensus axioms are suspended usually in favor of vague, general axioms and even sometimes beliefs. Such arguments will rarely survive with the targeted domain. In many cases, you will see lawyerly-like arguments based completely on beliefs, leading the arguer to believe a logical presentation is being given, but rarely convincing anyone that has not the same beliefs**. It is difficult for the Lutheran to convince the Catholic of anything pertaining to their religious practices. It is difficult for the businessman to convince the teacher to use cost-accounting methods in the administration of their course.
Some observations.
Observation 1. A argument made from the expert in domain D1 about some aspect in domain D2 is rarely made to the practitioners of D2, but only those of D1 or possibly others. Experts like to extend their domain of expertise but are not stupid enough to take their arguments to the real experts. There are exceptions. Everybody knows education. Everybody knows politics. The biologist would not hesitate to tell even the President what sort of domestic policy to pursue, but would never tell a astrophysicist on how to pursue cosmology. The politician does not hesitate to impose new educational policy at any level, local, state, or national, but would never tell the accountant how to keep the company books or the engineer on how to build a bridge.
Observation 2. A practitioner in D1 may assert that the expert in D2 should do this and or that (e.g. exert moral caution) while not hesitating to do something equivalent within his own domain. This is not only transfer of expertise, but transfer of authority as well. It happens, nonetheless. The political scientist will caution the engineer to make more moral choices on how he or she applies skills in building machines but does not hesitate to write incendiary works inspiring workers (or whomever) to rise up and take command.
Observation 3. In extending expertise the D1 expert is likely to use overly general, vague, or unsupportable premises about the situation in D2. Often they amount to little more than beliefs or even faith. Normally, the expert D1 in makes the argument for others in his/her same domain or another domain altogether, say D3. The businessman will attempt to argue about some new educational program to the politician, but rarely to the educator.
Observation 4. In each domain there are sub domains, e.g. science as described above. There is little evidence that the transference phenomena exists with any credibility between members of different sub domains.
One area is strikingly void of the transference phenomena. That is in sports. You will almost never see a basketball player instructing a football player on how to play the game. This is akin to the sub domain idea within sciences. The expert from one sub domain does not tread on another, but this is consistent with Observation 4. However, you will see fans by the millions more than willing to help out, usually from their armchairs, the home team with better game-day strategies.
The moral of this story is that if you wish to jump ship from your expertise to another, don't do it in your target domain. In erudite terms, do it only within your sphere of influence. In day-to-day language, do it in your own backyard.
* Toulmin, Steven, The Uses of Argument, Cambridge University Press, 2003, (originally printed in 1958).
**Wade, Nicolas, The Faith Instinct - How Religion Evolved and Why It Endures , The Penguin Press, 2009.
More at http://used-ideas.blogspot.com/
[I'm not sure if this note is an admonition to others or a personal admission; let's make it both to be on the safe side.]
We restrict this note to arguments made outside one’s expertise, not within for which there are many more argument types. The expertise areas will be called domains. So, we are discussing the arguments made by a person, expert in one domain, toward conclusions made for another domain. For our purposes here we use the domains: Science, Education, Politics, Philosophy, Religion, Humanities, and Business. You may wish to add your own.
The types of assertions we discuss are direct assertions/propositions, not matters of rhetoric, linguistics, or misconceptions*. (Examples. Education should definitely follow a business model. If economists only knew some mathematics, we could finally understand the economy. Art is simple, if you understand perspective drawing.) This is usually done through an argument of some kind, purporting to be a proof. There are at least three kinds of argument, those based on faith/beliefs, those on emotion, and those on logic. The first two are not very convincing to anyone. If I argue to the businessman he/she should pursue a venture in Bolivia because I just feel its right, I may not make progress. If I argue a colleague the correctness of using prayer in the schools as a relaxation therapy on the basis of my personal faith, I may get nowhere. Emotional and belief based arguments are relatively weak and readily identified. The “proof” part of the argument dissolves.
Only the third has validity, therefore we’ll focus only on logical arguments (or proofs). Such arguments are the lingua franca of convincing discussion these days, and for such an argument to be convincing, it must proceed first from hypothesis, then premise to point, then point to point, …, and finally point to conclusion, all using standard logical methods such a deduction, contradiction, contrapositive, and the like. Using induction is tempting, but usually wrong in other than mathematical proofs - or as they say induction produces a weak proof. What we will see is that usually the logic is ok, but it is too often built upon weak and even incorrect premises.
In sum, inside the domain, we make arguments based on consensus axioms and established modes of reasoning appropriate for the considered domain. Within domains, there are standard and well established acceptance and rejection criteria. For math, the standard theorem and proof are used to make an argument. This causes some applied mathematicians difficulty and credibility problems as they often produce algorithms, models, and computer data in lieu of theorems. Physicists also use theorems, but with axioms that have their base in physics principles. Applied physicists, chemists, and many biologists use experimental methodologies, with their “finding” link with previous results. In education, the standard presentation of an argument is to (a) do a literature review, (b) state the research questions, (c) review the methodology of the intervention, (d) give results of the intervention, and (e) make conclusions. Each domain has its own accepted methods to argue.
Arguing outside the domain is another matter altogether. Normally, we try to use our same methodologies but in a different domain. The consensus axioms are suspended usually in favor of vague, general axioms and even sometimes beliefs. Such arguments will rarely survive with the targeted domain. In many cases, you will see lawyerly-like arguments based completely on beliefs, leading the arguer to believe a logical presentation is being given, but rarely convincing anyone that has not the same beliefs**. It is difficult for the Lutheran to convince the Catholic of anything pertaining to their religious practices. It is difficult for the businessman to convince the teacher to use cost-accounting methods in the administration of their course.
Some observations.
Observation 1. A argument made from the expert in domain D1 about some aspect in domain D2 is rarely made to the practitioners of D2, but only those of D1 or possibly others. Experts like to extend their domain of expertise but are not stupid enough to take their arguments to the real experts. There are exceptions. Everybody knows education. Everybody knows politics. The biologist would not hesitate to tell even the President what sort of domestic policy to pursue, but would never tell a astrophysicist on how to pursue cosmology. The politician does not hesitate to impose new educational policy at any level, local, state, or national, but would never tell the accountant how to keep the company books or the engineer on how to build a bridge.
Observation 2. A practitioner in D1 may assert that the expert in D2 should do this and or that (e.g. exert moral caution) while not hesitating to do something equivalent within his own domain. This is not only transfer of expertise, but transfer of authority as well. It happens, nonetheless. The political scientist will caution the engineer to make more moral choices on how he or she applies skills in building machines but does not hesitate to write incendiary works inspiring workers (or whomever) to rise up and take command.
Observation 3. In extending expertise the D1 expert is likely to use overly general, vague, or unsupportable premises about the situation in D2. Often they amount to little more than beliefs or even faith. Normally, the expert D1 in makes the argument for others in his/her same domain or another domain altogether, say D3. The businessman will attempt to argue about some new educational program to the politician, but rarely to the educator.
Observation 4. In each domain there are sub domains, e.g. science as described above. There is little evidence that the transference phenomena exists with any credibility between members of different sub domains.
One area is strikingly void of the transference phenomena. That is in sports. You will almost never see a basketball player instructing a football player on how to play the game. This is akin to the sub domain idea within sciences. The expert from one sub domain does not tread on another, but this is consistent with Observation 4. However, you will see fans by the millions more than willing to help out, usually from their armchairs, the home team with better game-day strategies.
The moral of this story is that if you wish to jump ship from your expertise to another, don't do it in your target domain. In erudite terms, do it only within your sphere of influence. In day-to-day language, do it in your own backyard.
* Toulmin, Steven, The Uses of Argument, Cambridge University Press, 2003, (originally printed in 1958).
**Wade, Nicolas, The Faith Instinct - How Religion Evolved and Why It Endures , The Penguin Press, 2009.
More at http://used-ideas.blogspot.com/
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